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feat: publish Tend v0.2 preview source

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Publish the reviewed allowlisted snapshot whose exact binary completed maintenance deployment, rollback, and reactivation exercises for Gamertan and Sandwich Hime.

Private-Source-Commit: 4d7094c8b7c61991bfb67b11fc1558724c874eb2

Private-Source-Tree: 54a2f74804f7acddf3755d7d4da5b97f5fc28381

AI-Assistance: OpenAI Codex assisted implementation, testing, security review, and release verification.
Signed-off-by: Cole Speelman <crspeelman@gmail.com>
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gamertan
2026-08-16 19:02:08 -04:00
parent b2cc4482f6
commit 00d1dd4209
47 changed files with 1590 additions and 124 deletions
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docs/THREAT_MODEL.md
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- Caddy configuration validates before reload.
- An activation failure restores the previously observed state.
- Active and previous releases survive pruning.
- The restricted receiver accepts one versioned bounded stream, one allowlisted
service name, and one explicitly approved digest. It accepts no remote path,
URL, environment value, or shell expression.
- OpenSSH host keys are pinned; forwarding, PTYs, proxy commands, local commands,
and user SSH configuration are disabled by the client invocation.
- Production secret values are absent from configuration, process arguments,
artifacts, manifests, reports, deployment state, and Tend logs.
- One host-wide lock serializes shared Caddy activation without stopping or
reconfiguring unrelated services.
## Trusted inputs
Reviewed source, the Go toolchain, root-owned `tend.json`, systemd unit files,
the Caddy handler template, the operator, and the target host's root account are
trusted. Packaging a hostile repository can execute hostile Go compiler hooks
or consume resources; Tend is not a source-code sandbox.
Reviewed source, the pinned Go toolchain, root-owned server policy and service
configuration, systemd unit files, the Caddy handler template, the operator,
and the target host's root account are trusted. Packaging a hostile repository
can execute hostile Go compiler hooks or consume resources; Tend is not a
source-code sandbox.
## Adversarial inputs
Artifact paths and bytes, archive metadata, stale or malformed state, HTTP
responses, subprocess failures, and filesystem objects at managed paths are
validated and fail closed. Process output is bounded.
Artifact paths and bytes, protocol frames, requested service names, archive
metadata, stale or malformed state, HTTP responses, subprocess failures, and
filesystem objects at managed paths are validated and fail closed. Process
output and receive fields are bounded.
## Non-goals and preview limits
Tend does not defend against a concurrently malicious root user, a compromised
kernel/toolchain/systemd/Caddy installation, denial of service by the trusted
application, or secrets already exposed through service configuration. v0.1
does not manage data migrations, databases, containers, Kubernetes, or
application-specific activation. Transfer remains an application-local,
reviewed step until a transport can be added without weakening host-key and
credential boundaries.
kernel/toolchain/systemd/Caddy/OpenSSH installation, denial of service by the
trusted application, or secrets an application itself exposes. It does not
manage data migrations, databases, containers, Kubernetes, or application-specific
activation. EQL therefore remains outside the generic deployment adapter until
its SQLite/catalog publication checkpoints can be modeled explicitly.