Export the reviewed allowlisted snapshot from private source commit 8aab3db43f35e6a49aa497f45d73701b13fc9f32 and tree 992132ea4703437dc13ffdbb04a077816c02caf9. This includes routed singleton continuity, deployment evidence, strict schema-2 configuration, restricted transport, and the independently compilable public-tree guard. AI-Assisted: OpenAI Codex Signed-off-by: Cole Speelman <crspeelman@gmail.com>
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Architecture
Tend has three deliberately separate boundaries.
Package boundary
tend package accepts only a clean checkout whose HEAD exactly matches the
configured pushed branch. It rejects Go module replacements and unversioned
dependencies, builds the configured main package twice with GOWORK=off, and
requires byte-identical output. The resulting archive contains only:
- the service binary;
RELEASE.json;BUILDINFO.json;SBOM.spdx.json; andSHA256SUMS.
The external archive digest is the release identity used by deployment.
Transport boundary
tend push sends one bounded protocol frame to a dedicated account through a
pinned OpenSSH host key. It uses an argument vector, disables config files,
forwarding, PTYs, local commands, and proxy commands, and requests exactly
tend-receive-v1. The account's forced command invokes only the root-owned
receiver. The receiver's root-owned policy maps an allowlisted service name to
one exact configuration path and size ceiling.
The target receives no source, repository credential, Go cache, dependency, or arbitrary command. The artifact digest must equal both the produced digest and the separately supplied approved digest before it is staged.
Target-host boundary
Schema-2 configurations live below /etc/tend/services/. Secrets live only in
separate /etc/tend/environment/*.env files that are root-owned, non-symlink,
and mode 0600. Configurations contain the path, never the values. Candidate
and installed units read the same file; Tend overrides only the candidate's
loopback listen address.
Dry-run validation extracts into a temporary directory and does not touch the release tree. Activation acquires the shared lock, installs a content-addressed release, verifies all embedded checksums and manifest fields, and starts the candidate without evaluating configuration as shell code.
Activation boundary
Blue/green mode points the inactive slot at the new release, restarts and probes it, atomically replaces one imported Caddy handler, validates the full Caddy configuration, reloads Caddy, and records the prior active slot.
Singleton mode starts the new release in a hardened transient systemd unit on a separate loopback address and probes it. Tend then validates and atomically routes the imported Caddy handler to that candidate. While the candidate serves the canonical origin, Tend changes the current release pointer, restarts and probes the installed fixed-address unit, validates Caddy again, and routes back to it. The candidate remains healthy through the activation window and stops only after the handoff succeeds.
After the local post-activation probes, Tend also checks configured HTTPS public origins throughout a bounded activation window. Blue/green mode also probes the previous slot, and singleton mode probes the handoff candidate, for health and readiness throughout that window. Any failure before success is recorded restores the previously observed Caddy bytes and/or release pointers. State records desired, candidate, active, previous, and last-attempt release identities, including failed attempts without claiming they became active. Rollback is a separate explicit command over the recorded state. It rechecks local health/readiness and public reachability, but deliberately does not apply a future release's content marker to an older release whose routes may differ. Pruning preserves both active and previous releases.
Evidence boundary
Every attempted activation and explicit rollback emits bounded, versioned JSONL events with an operation ID, service, approved artifact digest, source commit, release version, phase, slot, elapsed duration, and outcome. Values are validated rather than copied from command output. The log contains no environment values, arbitrary process output, HTTP bodies, or secret paths. Identity, entropy, file, and downstream observability failures are deliberately best effort and cannot control Tend's deployment or rollback result.