release: publish Web Foundations Preview 2 snapshot

Sanitized allowlisted snapshot of private source 0acd276fb3423405daf7fff26dedc92b8281e2bd. Adds organization, team, invitation, resource hierarchy, scoped access, and audited break-glass foundations while preserving Preview 1.

AI-Assistance: OpenAI Codex assisted implementation, testing, security review, and release preparation.
Signed-off-by: Cole Speelman <crspeelman@gmail.com>

docs/THREAT_MODEL.md

@@ -10,7 +10,9 @@ selected storage adapters are trusted.
 Controls include explicit proxy trust, bounded parsing, cryptographic request
 and session identifiers, digest-only session storage, Argon2id passwords,
 constant-time comparisons, same-origin and CSRF primitives, fail-closed storage
-errors, and separate safe/sensitive analytics projections.
+errors, separate safe/sensitive analytics projections, organization-scoped
+bindings, single-use invitation digests, and short-lived audited break-glass
+grants.
 
 Unsafe methods without an exact Origin or trustworthy same-origin Fetch
 Metadata fail the origin check. Authentication middleware fails closed when its
@@ -22,6 +24,12 @@ configured reverse proxy, authorize application routes automatically, encrypt a
 compromised host, or decide how long an operator may lawfully retain personal
 request evidence.
 
+Applications must pass the authenticated user and requested resource hierarchy
+to `access.Authorize`; possessing a platform-level `auth` role does not bypass
+that decision. Team membership is resolved by the repository rather than
+accepted from request input. Break-glass access lasts at most one hour and is
+not a substitute for ordinary role policy.
+
 Local storage adapters assume the parent directory and host account are trusted.
 They reject a symlink at the configured final path and apply private file modes,
 but they do not defend against a concurrent privileged actor replacing path