web/docs/THREAT_MODEL.md

Threat model

The toolkit treats the public network, forwarding headers, request targets, cookies, credentials, and stored request records as untrusted. Application code, the configured trusted-proxy set, server filesystem permissions, and explicitly selected storage adapters are trusted.

Controls include explicit proxy trust, bounded parsing, cryptographic request and session identifiers, digest-only session storage, Argon2id passwords, constant-time comparisons, same-origin and CSRF primitives, fail-closed storage errors, separate safe/sensitive analytics projections, organization-scoped bindings, single-use invitation digests, and short-lived audited break-glass grants.

An application may create an account with a cryptographically generated temporary credential and RequirePasswordChange. Successful rotation compares the current credential, replaces its Argon2id hash, clears the requirement, and revokes every session in one repository transaction. The application must restrict such a principal to password change and logout until rotation succeeds; the library does not infer route policy. Temporary credentials must be written to a private channel or mode-0600 file and must never be printed into logs, manifests, process arguments, or deployment state.

Administrative recovery is deliberately a separate capability. The storage adapter atomically replaces the credential, restores the password-change requirement, revokes all sessions, and appends a generic audit event. The core library does not expose a recovery HTTP handler, deliver the credential, or authorize the local operator. Applications must keep that command local, generate the credential cryptographically, and write it only to a newly created private file. A recovery must not reveal whether an account exists through a public request surface.

Unsafe methods without an exact Origin or trustworthy same-origin Fetch Metadata fail the origin check. Authentication middleware fails closed when its service or __Host- cookie policy is invalid. Imported request records have bounded byte and duration fields before analytics sums them.

The toolkit does not sandbox application handlers, secure an incorrectly configured reverse proxy, authorize application routes automatically, encrypt a compromised host, or decide how long an operator may lawfully retain personal request evidence.

Applications must pass the authenticated user and requested resource hierarchy to access.Authorize; possessing a platform-level auth role does not bypass that decision. Team membership is resolved by the repository rather than accepted from request input. Break-glass access lasts at most one hour and is not a substitute for ordinary role policy.

Local storage adapters assume the parent directory and host account are trusted. They reject a symlink at the configured final path and apply private file modes, but they do not defend against a concurrent privileged actor replacing path ancestors during an open. The synchronous JSONL adapter deliberately favors durable, bounded evidence over maximum request throughput; the application owns rotation, retention, disk monitoring, and health escalation.