4.2 KiB
Threat model
The toolkit treats the public network, forwarding headers, request targets, cookies, credentials, and stored request records as untrusted. Application code, the configured trusted-proxy set, server filesystem permissions, and explicitly selected storage adapters are trusted.
Controls include explicit proxy trust, bounded parsing, cryptographic request and session identifiers, digest-only session storage, Argon2id passwords, constant-time comparisons, same-origin and CSRF primitives, fail-closed storage errors, separate safe/sensitive analytics projections, organization-scoped bindings, single-use invitation digests, and short-lived audited break-glass grants.
Passkey ceremonies require one exact HTTPS origin and relying-party ID, discoverable credentials, user verification, and single-use random challenges. The SQLite adapter consumes enrollment tokens and ceremonies atomically. Operation approvals retain a separate digest of canonical application state; the random WebAuthn challenge is never replaced by a predictable state hash. Cross-origin ceremonies, unsupported credential algorithms, expired state, and binding drift fail closed. Signature-counter clone warnings are surfaced for audit but do not automatically lock out multi-device passkeys whose counters legitimately remain zero.
An application may create an account with a cryptographically generated
temporary credential and RequirePasswordChange. Successful rotation compares
the current credential, replaces its Argon2id hash, clears the requirement, and
revokes every session in one repository transaction. The application must
restrict such a principal to password change and logout until rotation succeeds;
the library does not infer route policy. Temporary credentials must be written
to a private channel or mode-0600 file and must never be printed into logs,
manifests, process arguments, or deployment state.
Administrative recovery is deliberately a separate capability. The storage adapter atomically replaces the credential, restores the password-change requirement, revokes all sessions, and appends a generic audit event. The core library does not expose a recovery HTTP handler, deliver the credential, or authorize the local operator. Applications must keep that command local, generate the credential cryptographically, and write it only to a newly created private file. A recovery must not reveal whether an account exists through a public request surface.
Passkey-only recovery never creates a password or remote fallback. A local administrator revokes sessions and active ceremonies and issues a short-lived single-use enrollment token. Existing passkeys remain visible so the operator can review and remove lost credentials after enrolling a replacement. The library prevents remote removal of the final credential; applications should require a freshly bound passkey assertion before every removal.
Unsafe methods without an exact Origin or trustworthy same-origin Fetch
Metadata fail the origin check. Authentication middleware fails closed when its
service or __Host- cookie policy is invalid. Imported request records have
bounded byte and duration fields before analytics sums them.
The toolkit does not sandbox application handlers, secure an incorrectly configured reverse proxy, authorize application routes automatically, encrypt a compromised host, or decide how long an operator may lawfully retain personal request evidence.
Applications must pass the authenticated user and requested resource hierarchy
to access.Authorize; possessing a platform-level auth role does not bypass
that decision. Team membership is resolved by the repository rather than
accepted from request input. Break-glass access lasts at most one hour and is
not a substitute for ordinary role policy.
Local storage adapters assume the parent directory and host account are trusted. They reject a symlink at the configured final path and apply private file modes, but they do not defend against a concurrent privileged actor replacing path ancestors during an open. The synchronous JSONL adapter deliberately favors durable, bounded evidence over maximum request throughput; the application owns rotation, retention, disk monitoring, and health escalation.