tend/docs/DOGFOOD_EVIDENCE.md

# Preview dogfood evidence

This is maintainer-run operational evidence, not an independent audit or a
general reliability claim. It records the acceptance campaign completed on
August 14, 2026 before Tend's first public preview.

## Restricted multi-service campaign — August 16, 2026

Tend's v0.2 implementation candidate completed the same maintenance contract
through the restricted transport for two independently configured services on
one Linux/systemd/Caddy host.

### Assessed Tend implementation

- Implementation source commit:
  `840b77da708bbcd87a3203fb6a1f99b2984b8667`.
- Linux/amd64 candidate binary SHA-256:
  `b3961315288871fa6085bf3b75c784a825a88f2bc3dd0694ad5d6c590eddf895`.
- Candidate archive SHA-256:
  `948bad5271dca08b9445c387c5aea7f58f22add6b47b9071e1801a756aa71259`.
- Toolchain: Go 1.26.6, `CGO_ENABLED=0`, `-trimpath`.
- Trusted Gitea verification run 119 and release-candidate run 120 passed for
  the exact implementation commit. CI and an independent, network-disabled
  build each produced the same archive digest twice.
- The installed receiver accepted only a pinned Ed25519 host key, a dedicated
  forced-command deployment key, the exact `tend-receive-v1` protocol, two
  allowlisted service names, and separately repeated artifact digests. An
  attempted arbitrary SSH command was refused.
- Production source, Go caches, repository credentials, secret values, remote
  paths, and shell commands did not cross the transport boundary.

Adding this evidence changes VCS build metadata but not executable logic. The
signed preview tag and attached release evidence therefore identify the final
evidence-bearing candidate and its required last maintenance pass.

### Gamertan blue-green campaign

- Application source commit:
  `a7e54047d3dc11671824b6ecc8ed698a9dd04421`.
- Preview 27 artifact SHA-256:
  `edadef3a97c089771e2b6bb7dadd58928762284878f76f23b112c61ae282f17f`.
- The artifact was built twice, byte-identically, in the pinned Go 1.26.6
  image with networking disabled and the audited cached module graph.
- The inactive slot passed health, readiness, page-marker, Caddy validation,
  public-origin, Sandwich Hime mount, and EQL continuity checks before traffic
  moved.
- Explicit rollback restored preview 26; its readiness and public boundary
  passed; preview 27 was then reactivated through the recorded state.
- Sandwich Hime's release pointer and service remained unchanged throughout.

### Sandwich Hime singleton campaign

- Application source commit:
  `435880c6751b773b6c5ee3ae6833d26e8eb7c0df`.
- Preview 30 artifact SHA-256:
  `bee8d5bcde2c3c2e8bb96d5909a19889fc7f0be9390046c243fe20c9ff2ca44b`.
- The artifact was built twice, byte-identically, in the same pinned,
  network-disabled Go 1.26.6 environment.
- A transient DynamicUser candidate passed health, readiness, tutorial marker,
  canonical-origin, and Gamertan-mounted checks before the singleton pointer
  and installed service changed. The candidate port was released afterward.
- Explicit rollback restored preview 28; its readiness and public boundary
  passed; preview 30 was then reactivated through the recorded state.
- Both Gamertan slots, its selected Caddy upstream, and EQL remained healthy.

### Findings resolved by dogfood

The first restricted transfer stopped before artifact validation because
`sudo` removed `SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND`. The forced account still refused the
request; no service state changed. The 0BSD sudoers template now preserves only
that one server-supplied variable, while the receiver requires its exact
protocol value and rejects every other command.

The first singleton candidate stopped before pointer mutation because the
shared environment file's live listen value overrode the candidate address.
The site remained on its former release and retained the same process. Tend now
rejects singleton shared environment files containing the configured listen
key; installed units own the non-secret live address and Tend supplies only the
transient candidate address.

Final verification found both service states valid, every installed unit and
Caddy active with zero restart failures, the candidate port closed, no warning
or error entries after the successful campaign, and representative Gamertan,
Sandwich Hime, mounted, and EQL routes returning HTTP 200.

## Assessed candidate

- Source commit: `306d085e518cb4fe7b20a66d1e2ceb171e54ebdc`.
- Linux/amd64 candidate binary SHA-256:
  `a9d53e286317d5acad9c0c321dc8d6240efee1e992714a892aba5be7c190dffc`.
- Candidate archive SHA-256:
  `52639d16cd55b1dfe7c4ce63d4523676a6e8fe7cf57ef25787938c4070f49bd3`.
- Toolchain: Go 1.26.6, `CGO_ENABLED=0`, `-trimpath`.
- Two fresh packages from the clean pushed commit were byte-identical.
- Tests, race tests, vet, license checks, public-snapshot isolation, and
  `govulncheck v1.1.4` passed. The vulnerability scan reported no known
  reachable vulnerabilities with the August 14, 2026 database.
- Trusted Gitea verification completed successfully for the exact commit.

The release tag and attached assets must still identify their own exact source
commit and digests. Any code change after this campaign requires the dogfood
sequence to be repeated.

A fresh-install check after the first immutable source tag found that the CLI
reported its development identity instead of the tagged module version. No
deployment logic or artifact content was ambiguous, but the distribution
identity was not acceptable. Preview 1 remains immutable and withdrawn;
Preview 2 adds Go build-information version selection and repeats the release
gates rather than retagging old content.

## Sandwich Hime website

The singleton-candidate strategy packaged and activated website preview 25:

- application source commit:
  `0429e3f0160aa4fd4d262bc5857bc232c2149cb8`;
- artifact SHA-256:
  `25025a05bb1aa6689f5f0779064b24a7c8193ff93c1395a2b3bd342588c3926a`;
- application toolchain: Go 1.26.6;
- isolated transient candidate passed health, readiness, and application
  smoke checks before the singleton pointer changed;
- explicit rollback returned to preview 24, and the exact approved preview 25
  artifact was then reactivated;
- canonical, documentation, news, `llms.txt`, and Gamertan-mounted routes
  returned HTTP 200 after reactivation.

## Gamertan

The blue-green strategy packaged and activated Gamertan preview 8:

- application source commit:
  `3acfa6a8e66ca3827c840d1fe9bc0b51c69c0a45`;
- artifact SHA-256:
  `76db7a9a6c496c204f653dc5e42c935272159320cc344b6a4db6374535c696ad`;
- application toolchain: Go 1.26.6;
- the inactive slot passed health, readiness, and page-marker checks before a
  validated atomic Caddy handler replacement;
- the handler retained `root:caddy` ownership, mode `0640`, and Sandwich Hime
  routing precedence;
- explicit rollback restored preview 7, and the exact approved preview 8
  artifact was then reactivated;
- homepage, project pages, news, feed, discovery files, the Sandwich Hime
  mount, and EQL Helper continuity returned HTTP 200 after reactivation.

## Finding resolved during the campaign

An earlier rollback attempt stopped safely before changing traffic because it
applied the new release's content markers to an older release whose route set
was different. Tend now uses the full configured smoke suite for new
deployments and health/readiness checks for an already-recorded rollback
target. A regression test requires that separation. The fixed candidate then
completed both live rollback sequences.

## Boundaries

The campaign covered one Linux/systemd/Caddy host and two small Go services.
It did not cover databases, migrations, containers, Kubernetes, hostile root,
or EQL Helper's application-specific catalog activation. Artifact transport
remains an application-owned, host-key-verified step outside Tend v0.1.