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auth: publish passkey foundations preview
2026-08-21 17:33:00 -04:00

206 lines
8.0 KiB
Go

package protocol
import (
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"gamertan.com/web/internal/webauthnvendored/protocol/webauthncose"
)
// The CredentialAssertionResponse is the raw response returned to the Relying Party from an authenticator when we request a
// credential for login/assertion.
type CredentialAssertionResponse struct {
PublicKeyCredential
AssertionResponse AuthenticatorAssertionResponse `json:"response"`
}
// The ParsedCredentialAssertionData is the parsed [CredentialAssertionResponse] that has been marshalled into a format
// that allows us to verify the client and authenticator data inside the response.
type ParsedCredentialAssertionData struct {
ParsedPublicKeyCredential
Response ParsedAssertionResponse
Raw CredentialAssertionResponse
}
// The AuthenticatorAssertionResponse contains the raw authenticator assertion data and is parsed into
// [ParsedAssertionResponse].
type AuthenticatorAssertionResponse struct {
AuthenticatorResponse
AuthenticatorData URLEncodedBase64 `json:"authenticatorData"`
Signature URLEncodedBase64 `json:"signature"`
UserHandle URLEncodedBase64 `json:"userHandle,omitempty"`
}
// ParsedAssertionResponse is the parsed form of [AuthenticatorAssertionResponse].
type ParsedAssertionResponse struct {
CollectedClientData CollectedClientData
AuthenticatorData AuthenticatorData
Signature []byte
UserHandle []byte
}
// ParseCredentialRequestResponse parses a login/assertion response from a [*http.Request]. The request body is
// automatically drained and closed after parsing.
//
// This is the standard entry point when using [net/http]. For implementations that don't use [net/http], see
// [ParseCredentialRequestResponseBody] (accepts an [io.Reader]) or [ParseCredentialRequestResponseBytes] (accepts a
// []byte).
func ParseCredentialRequestResponse(response *http.Request) (*ParsedCredentialAssertionData, error) {
if response == nil || response.Body == nil {
return nil, ErrBadRequest.WithDetails("No response given")
}
defer func(request *http.Request) {
_, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, request.Body)
_ = request.Body.Close()
}(response)
return ParseCredentialRequestResponseBody(response.Body)
}
// ParseCredentialRequestResponseBody parses a login/assertion response from an [io.Reader]. The caller is responsible
// for closing the reader if applicable.
//
// This is the framework-agnostic variant of [ParseCredentialRequestResponse]. For a [*http.Request] use
// [ParseCredentialRequestResponse] instead. For raw bytes use [ParseCredentialRequestResponseBytes].
func ParseCredentialRequestResponseBody(body io.Reader) (par *ParsedCredentialAssertionData, err error) {
var car CredentialAssertionResponse
if err = decodeBody(body, &car); err != nil {
return nil, ErrBadRequest.WithDetails("Parse error for Assertion").WithInfo(err.Error()).WithError(err)
}
return car.Parse()
}
// ParseCredentialRequestResponseBytes parses a login/assertion response from raw bytes.
//
// See also [ParseCredentialRequestResponse] (for [*http.Request]) and [ParseCredentialRequestResponseBody] (for
// [io.Reader]).
func ParseCredentialRequestResponseBytes(data []byte) (par *ParsedCredentialAssertionData, err error) {
var car CredentialAssertionResponse
if err = decodeBytes(data, &car); err != nil {
return nil, ErrBadRequest.WithDetails("Parse error for Assertion").WithInfo(err.Error()).WithError(err)
}
return car.Parse()
}
// Parse validates and parses the [CredentialAssertionResponse] into a [ParsedCredentialAssertionData]. Most
// implementations should use [ParseCredentialRequestResponse], [ParseCredentialRequestResponseBody], or
// [ParseCredentialRequestResponseBytes] instead of calling this method directly.
func (car CredentialAssertionResponse) Parse() (par *ParsedCredentialAssertionData, err error) {
if car.ID == "" {
return nil, ErrBadRequest.WithDetails("CredentialAssertionResponse with ID missing")
}
if _, err = base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(car.ID); err != nil {
return nil, ErrBadRequest.WithDetails("CredentialAssertionResponse with ID not base64url encoded").WithError(err)
}
if car.Type != string(PublicKeyCredentialType) {
return nil, ErrBadRequest.WithDetails("CredentialAssertionResponse with bad type")
}
var attachment AuthenticatorAttachment
switch att := AuthenticatorAttachment(car.AuthenticatorAttachment); att {
case Platform, CrossPlatform:
attachment = att
}
par = &ParsedCredentialAssertionData{
ParsedPublicKeyCredential{
ParsedCredential{car.ID, car.Type}, car.RawID, car.ClientExtensionResults, attachment,
},
ParsedAssertionResponse{
Signature: car.AssertionResponse.Signature,
UserHandle: car.AssertionResponse.UserHandle,
},
car,
}
// Step 5. Let JSONtext be the result of running UTF-8 decode on the value of cData.
// We don't call it cData but this is Step 5 in the spec.
if err = json.Unmarshal(car.AssertionResponse.ClientDataJSON, &par.Response.CollectedClientData); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err = par.Response.AuthenticatorData.Unmarshal(car.AssertionResponse.AuthenticatorData); err != nil {
return nil, ErrParsingData.WithDetails("Error unmarshalling auth data").WithError(err)
}
return par, nil
}
// Verify the remaining elements of the assertion data by following the steps outlined in the referenced specification
// documentation. It's important to note that the credentialBytes field is the CBOR representation of the credential.
//
// Specification: §7.2 Verifying an Authentication Assertion (https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn/#sctn-verifying-assertion)
func (p *ParsedCredentialAssertionData) Verify(storedChallenge string, relyingPartyID, appID string, rpOrigins, rpTopOrigins []string, rpTopOriginsVerify TopOriginVerificationMode, allowCrossOrigin, verifyUser, verifyUserPresence bool, credentialBytes []byte) error {
// Steps 4 through 6 in verifying the assertion data (https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn/#verifying-assertion) are
// "assertive" steps, i.e. "Let JSONtext be the result of running UTF-8 decode on the value of cData."
// We handle these steps in part as we verify but also beforehand
//
// Handle steps 7 through 10 of assertion by verifying stored data against the Collected Client Data
// returned by the authenticator.
validError := p.Response.CollectedClientData.Verify(storedChallenge, AssertCeremony, rpOrigins, rpTopOrigins, rpTopOriginsVerify, allowCrossOrigin)
if validError != nil {
return validError
}
// Begin Step 11. Verify that the rpIdHash in authData is the SHA-256 hash of the RP ID expected by the RP.
rpIDHash := sha256.Sum256([]byte(relyingPartyID))
var appIDHash [32]byte
if appID != "" {
appIDHash = sha256.Sum256([]byte(appID))
}
// Handle steps 11 through 14, verifying the authenticator data.
validError = p.Response.AuthenticatorData.Verify(rpIDHash[:], appIDHash[:], verifyUser, verifyUserPresence)
if validError != nil {
return validError
}
// Step 15. Let hash be the result of computing a hash over the cData using SHA-256.
clientDataHash := sha256.Sum256(p.Raw.AssertionResponse.ClientDataJSON)
// Step 16. Using the credential public key looked up in step 3, verify that sig is
// a valid signature over the binary concatenation of authData and hash.
sigData := append(p.Raw.AssertionResponse.AuthenticatorData, clientDataHash[:]...) //nolint:gocritic // This is intentional.
var (
key any
err error
)
// If the Session Data does not contain the appID extension or it wasn't reported as used by the Client/RP then we
// use the standard CTAP2 public key parser.
if appID == "" {
key, err = webauthncose.ParsePublicKey(credentialBytes)
} else {
key, err = webauthncose.ParseFIDOPublicKey(credentialBytes)
}
if err != nil {
return ErrAssertionSignature.WithDetails(fmt.Sprintf("Error parsing the assertion public key: %+v", err)).WithError(err)
}
valid, err := webauthncose.VerifySignature(key, sigData, p.Response.Signature)
if !valid || err != nil {
return ErrAssertionSignature.WithDetails(fmt.Sprintf("Error validating the assertion signature: %+v", err)).WithError(err)
}
return nil
}