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Publish the reviewed Web Foundations v0.1.0-preview.3 snapshot with cryptographic temporary credentials, explicit forced-rotation state, atomic password replacement and session revocation, additive SQLite migration, tests, and application-boundary documentation. Exported from reviewed private source b8fb4ff3cd012859f2d307dfb2a1cc783a38f6db after trusted CI run 257 and exact Go 1.26.6 verification. Material implementation assistance provided by OpenAI Codex; reviewed and verified through the maintainer workflow. Signed-off-by: Cole Speelman <crspeelman@gmail.com>
48 lines
2.6 KiB
Markdown
48 lines
2.6 KiB
Markdown
<!-- SPDX-License-Identifier: MPL-2.0 -->
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# Threat model
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The toolkit treats the public network, forwarding headers, request targets,
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cookies, credentials, and stored request records as untrusted. Application code,
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the configured trusted-proxy set, server filesystem permissions, and explicitly
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selected storage adapters are trusted.
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Controls include explicit proxy trust, bounded parsing, cryptographic request
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and session identifiers, digest-only session storage, Argon2id passwords,
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constant-time comparisons, same-origin and CSRF primitives, fail-closed storage
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errors, separate safe/sensitive analytics projections, organization-scoped
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bindings, single-use invitation digests, and short-lived audited break-glass
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grants.
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An application may create an account with a cryptographically generated
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temporary credential and `RequirePasswordChange`. Successful rotation compares
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the current credential, replaces its Argon2id hash, clears the requirement, and
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revokes every session in one repository transaction. The application must
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restrict such a principal to password change and logout until rotation succeeds;
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the library does not infer route policy. Temporary credentials must be written
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to a private channel or mode-`0600` file and must never be printed into logs,
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manifests, process arguments, or deployment state.
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Unsafe methods without an exact Origin or trustworthy same-origin Fetch
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Metadata fail the origin check. Authentication middleware fails closed when its
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service or `__Host-` cookie policy is invalid. Imported request records have
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bounded byte and duration fields before analytics sums them.
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The toolkit does not sandbox application handlers, secure an incorrectly
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configured reverse proxy, authorize application routes automatically, encrypt a
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compromised host, or decide how long an operator may lawfully retain personal
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request evidence.
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Applications must pass the authenticated user and requested resource hierarchy
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to `access.Authorize`; possessing a platform-level `auth` role does not bypass
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that decision. Team membership is resolved by the repository rather than
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accepted from request input. Break-glass access lasts at most one hour and is
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not a substitute for ordinary role policy.
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Local storage adapters assume the parent directory and host account are trusted.
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They reject a symlink at the configured final path and apply private file modes,
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but they do not defend against a concurrent privileged actor replacing path
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ancestors during an open. The synchronous JSONL adapter deliberately favors
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durable, bounded evidence over maximum request throughput; the application owns
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rotation, retention, disk monitoring, and health escalation.
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