web/docs/ORGANIZATIONS.md

<!-- SPDX-License-Identifier: MPL-2.0 -->

# Organizations and scoped access

One `auth.User` may belong to many organizations without creating another
credential or browser session. Organizations own projects; projects own
environments; environments own application services. Teams are optional groups
of active organization members.

`organizations.Service` creates those resources and issues digest-backed,
expiring, single-use invitations. An invitation may carry one direct role and
up to sixteen reviewed team memberships. Acceptance verifies that the
authenticated user's normalized email matches and applies the membership,
role, teams, consumption marker, and audit event in one transaction.
When `OwnerRole` is configured, creating or revoking an invitation carrying
that role additionally requires a current active direct owner inside the same
SQLite transaction. A broad access-management permission may administer
ordinary invitations but cannot create or cancel owner access.
Applications own invitation pages, email or out-of-band delivery, active-source
checks before archival, and account recovery.

Organizations and teams use optimistic revisions and reversible
`active`/`archived` states. Archived objects keep their history but contribute
no effective authority. Memberships may be suspended, reactivated, or removed;
team membership can be removed independently. Configure `OwnerRole` when
constructing the service before exposing membership-removal operations. The
SQLite adapter then refuses to suspend or remove the final active direct owner.

Fresh-authentication administration pages should use
`ChangeMembershipStatus` and `RemoveMembershipIfCurrent`, passing the exact
displayed state as `ExpectedStatus`. The SQLite adapter acquires its write lock
before checking that state, verifies the actor is still an active member of an
active organization, and commits the lifecycle effects and audit together.
Suspension removes team memberships; reactivation does not infer or restore
them. Removal also revokes current direct bindings. A repository without the
optimistic extension fails closed instead of falling back to a stale mutation.

For a reviewed access-administration page, use `organizations.Members` to list
bounded active and suspended memberships, and
`access.OrganizationUserBindings` to list only current direct,
organization-wide user roles. The latter intentionally excludes team grants
and project, environment, or service bindings. Replace a member's direct role
with `access.ReplaceOrganizationUserRole`, passing the exact displayed binding
IDs as `ExpectedBindingIDs`. The SQLite adapter serializes that replacement,
rejects stale state, writes the new binding and audit event atomically, and
will not demote the final active direct owner. The application must still
authorize the administrator and bind any required fresh passkey assertion to
the organization, target user, target role, and expected IDs.

`access.Service` evaluates a permission against a complete resource scope:

```go
decision, err := accessService.Authorize(ctx, principal.User.ID, access.Scope{
	OrganizationID: organizationID,
	ProjectID:      projectID,
	EnvironmentID:  environmentID,
	ServiceID:      serviceID,
}, "telemetry.read")
```

A binding at organization scope covers its descendants. A narrower binding
covers only its matching branch. The repository resolves team membership; a
handler must never accept caller-supplied team identifiers as authority.

Platform roles in `auth.Principal` remain useful for installation health,
account administration, and other explicitly global operations. They do not
grant organization-data access. If an operator must inspect tenant data during
an incident, use a reasoned break-glass grant. It expires within one hour and
creates an append-only audit event in the same transaction.

An application that offers owner-assisted account recovery must not infer that
authority from a broad administration page. Use the dedicated
`authrecovery.IssueAssistedRecovery` boundary after an operation-bound passkey
assertion. The SQLite adapter requires a current active direct owner binding
and active target membership in the same transaction that invalidates the old
credentials and records the organization-visible recovery audit. Team,
break-glass, platform, and merely descriptive roles do not satisfy this owner
check.

The SQLite adapter namespaces all tables, enforces active organization and team
membership plus resource ancestry before accepting or evaluating a binding,
and keeps invitations and sessions as digests. Applications remain responsible
for database backup, filesystem ownership, retention, and presenting audit
history to organization owners.